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Introduction  
The historical handmaiden of warning ambiguity is the tendency of strategic planners to obsess 
over familiar dangers at the expense of more likely ones.  
Likely threats appeared to clash with more familiar ones when, just four months after 9/11, the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) released the National Intelligence Estimate on the ballistic 
missile threat to the United States. In it, the intelligence community argued that the United States 
is more likely to be attacked with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) using “ships, trucks, 
airplanes or other means” than with an intercontinental range ballistic missile.  
The 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) also stated that cruise missiles launched from 
forward areas—the most plausible scheme being the use of a covertly equipped commercial 
vessel—offer an adversary better alternatives than ballistic missiles.[1] Although the intelligence 
community had state actors principally in mind, terrorists and non-state actors have also figured 
into American planning. In a 2001 counter-terrorism exercise, North American Aerospace 
Defense Command (NORAD) simulated a cruise missile launch from a merchant ship in the Gulf 
of Mexico, which led the NORAD test director observed, “we are naked … [and] have no capacity 
to deal with that kind of problem.”[2]  
Of course, it’s one thing for a state—possessing all the necessary engineering skills and 
experience—to produce and furnish an armed, unmanned air vehicle (UAV) or cruise missile to a 
terrorist group. Just such a linkage was purported to exist between Iraq and al Qaeda, at least 
according to the Bush administration, in early 2003.[3] And Iran appears to have furnished the 
terrorist group Hezbollah with their unarmed Mohajer-4 UAV, which was flown over northern 
Israel in November 2004 and April 2005, both times surprising and embarrassing Israeli air 
defenses.[4]  
Yet to suppose that a sub-national terrorist group, on its own, could develop such a delivery 
system deserves closer scrutiny.[5] Certainly, a terrorist group could take advantage of the last 
decade’s quantum leap in dual-use technologies that comprise the chief components of 
autonomous air vehicles. These include satellite navigation and guidance furnished primarily by 
the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS), high-resolution satellite imagery from a growing 
number of commercial vendors, and digital mapping technologies for mission planning. Indeed, 
the presumption that virtually any person or small group with the appropriate knowledge and skills 
could build a simple, autonomous, self-guided cruise missile with a significant payload is 
increasingly becoming the conventional wisdom.  
To examine the possible use of UAVs or cruise missiles as terrorist weapons, this article 
approaches the subject from two principal angles: motivations and capabilities. To be sure, 
possession of the requisite “knowledge and skills,” together with easy opportunities to procure all 
the component parts, represents a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of this examination. All 
too frequently, proliferation questions are addressed from the standpoint of raw technological 
determinism. A more complex web of planning motivations and technological factors inform 
whether or not terrorists will successfully pursue the use of UAVs or cruise missiles to achieve 
their objectives.  
After considering motivations, the article turns to capabilities by examining two possible and 
relevant scenarios of terrorist use of UAVs or cruise missiles: conversion of an anti-ship cruise 
missile for launching from an off-shore freighter, and transformation of a simple airplane into an 
unmanned means of achieving mass casualties.  
The article concludes with a consideration of international responses, both military and non-
military, to the challenges identified. 
Planning Motivations 
Scholars and counterterrorism practitioners alike now believe that a new form of religiously 
motivated terrorism has emerged, one that is unconstrained by the level of violence it seeks to 
achieve. This new brand of terrorism—unlike that practiced by ethno-nationalist terrorist groups 
such as the Irish Republican Army or Palestine Liberation Organization—is not amenable to 
diplomatic persuasion or political compromise. Its use of violence is designed not to secure a 
place at the bargaining table, but to destroy an existential adversary with whom bargaining is 
impermissible for theological reasons.[6] For those inclined toward this new brand of terrorism, 
there exists a complementary relationship between apocalyptic aims and weapons of mass 
destruction.  
Religiously motivated groups consider WMD the preferred means of killing, almost without regard 
to the challenges entailed in acquiring such weapons. Take, for example, the perverse Japanese 
cult, Aum Shinrikyo, that pursued both biological and chemical agents. It easily could have killed 
more people using conventional explosives than it managed in 1995 with its clumsy use of sarin 
gas in a Tokyo subway.[7] When it had failed to achieve any success pursuing biological agents, 
it turned to producing chemical, rather than conventional, weapons to achieve its apocalyptic 
aims.  
The evidence that al Qaeda is seeking WMD, while largely inferential, is nonetheless compelling. 
The Clinton administration attacked the Al Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum, Sudan in 
August 1998. However sullied by the controversy over this attack, the existence of covertly 
collected forensic evidence, together with the eventual testimony of Jamal Ahmed al-Fadl—a 
prosecution witness in the February 2001 trial for the bombings of two American embassies in 
East Africa—suggests a strong probability that al Qaeda was involved in producing chemical 
weapons in Sudan.[8]  
Even more convincing was the testimony of Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmoud, a former nuclear 
scientist at the Pakistan Atomic Energy Agency. He set up and used a non-governmental 
organization (NGO) in Kabul, the Islamic Reconstruction, as a vehicle to visit Afghanistan 
frequently between 1998 and 2001. Mahmoud finally admitted to his CIA interrogators that he met 
with Osama bin Laden and other al Qaeda members for two to three days in August 2001 to 
discuss WMD. Bin Laden was interested in nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and sought 
advice on how to build a “dirty bomb” to spread radiological debris; the source of the radiological 
materials was expected to be the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. A subsequent search of 
Mahmoud’s NGO offices in Kabul uncovered a history of efforts to obtain anthrax, documents on 
the U.S. military’s immunization program, gas masks, and diagrams of an aerial balloon system 
for dispersing biological or chemical agents.[9]  
There is strong evidence that the terrorists who planned and executed the September 11, 2001 
attacks on New York and Washington had investigated the use of crop dusters as terror weapons. 
After the 9/11 attacks, Zacarias Moussaoui, the so-called 20th hijacker, was arrested in 
possession of a crop dusting manual.[10] The plot’s ringleader, Mohammed Atta, made several 
visits to a crop dusting airfield in Florida where he asked about the speed and range of such 
aircraft and the volume of chemicals they could hold.[11] In May 2000, Atta even attempted to 
secure a $650,000 U.S. Department of Agriculture loan, purportedly to start a crop dusting 
business. He told the Florida agricultural official that he wanted to use the money to purchase a 
six-seat, twin-prop crop duster. He intended to remove the seats so as to fit a large chemical tank 
inside the aircraft, leaving space for only the pilot.[12]  
A pilot willing to die would certainly be needed to guide an unstable crop duster to its intended 
target. There is an intense fascination with suicide among religiously motivated terrorists—and 
jihadists in particular—which combines an element of romanticism with sacrifice and exculpation. 
However seductive this emotion, there is also a strong interest in attack effectiveness.  
Employing a suicide pilot to guide an airplane to its desired target seems to be integral to 
achieving mass casualties. Yet, an aerial balloon does not require a suicide pilot to guide it. 
Although balloon delivery of biological agents was investigated during the early years of the U.S. 
biological weapons program, it is not a very effective way to disseminate agents.[13] Conversely, 
UAVs and cruise missiles are ideal platforms to deliver such agents.  
The flight stability of aerodynamic UAVs and cruise missiles permits them to release and spray 
agents along a line of contamination.[14] Modeling indicates that these vehicles enlarge the lethal 
area for biological agents, conservatively, by a factor of ten when compared with ballistic missile 
delivery.[15] Radiological dispersal—an acknowledged area of al Qaeda interest—over large 
urban areas can also be effective with a UAV, but only if the source material is cesium chloride—
the one radiological source that comes in a powered form.[16] While such radiological dispersal 
would not truly measure up to the destructive damage of other WMD, it would play on the public’s 
fear of anything radiological and cause long-term disruption.  
Finally, the intended target’s vulnerabilities are critically important planning factors. Surely, that is 
what compelled al Qaeda to hijack large commercial airliners and effectively turn them into cruise 
missiles. The abysmal state of U.S. defenses against low-flying UAVs and cruise missiles invites 
terrorists to focus on acquiring them as terror weapons.[17]  
A July 8, 2004 House of Representatives hearing drew grim attention to the lax state of defenses 
against low-flying objects by examining the near-catastrophic circumstances surrounding the 
June 9, 2004 funeral for President Ronald Reagan. As officials gathered in the Capitol, a 
combination of human error, onboard technical malfunction, and computer incompatibility 
between the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) caused security personnel to mistake the governor of Kentucky’s official 
airplane as a terrorist threat. This led to the evacuation of hundreds of officials, the dispatch of 
two F-15 interceptors, and circumstances that nearly prompted the top general of NORAD to 
order the governor’s plane shot down.[18]  
This near disaster in Washington, D.C. underscores the inadequacy of the nation’s capacity to 
identify friend from foe. Each year, thousands of small private aircraft continue to wander into 
restricted air space around Washington, D.C.[19] In the case of the governor’s plane, this led to 
erring on the side of caution. But the fact that a disastrous mistake nearly ensued could produce 
an even more tragic result: inaction in the face of a genuine terrorist threat. In any event, the head 
of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s directorate in charge of air defense has admitted 
that the current system may not be able to stop a determined adversary.[20] An intelligent and 
committed terrorist is unlikely to fly a small airplane, whether manned or unmanned, above 3,000 
feet, the altitude at which the FAA’s radars would be able to detect and query the aircraft’s 
transponder to establish its intentions. Clearly, terrorist use of an aircraft or UAV would present 
severe warning, detection, and interception challenges. 
Technological Factors 
The notion that just about any person or small group could build, at minimal expense, a simple, 
self-guided cruise missile based entirely on off-the-shelf component technologies deserves some 
examination. This proposition was given light during 2003 by a New Zealand engineer, Bruce 
Simpson, who created a website with the sobriquet “Do-It-Yourself Cruise Missile.”[21] His 
objective was to document (and publish) his progress in building a simple cruise missile in his 
garage for under $5,000. Before having the chance to test his product, the New Zealand 
government, under pressure from the United States, forced Simpson to shut down his project. 
Simpson told BBC News that he had nevertheless proved “that by using off-the-shelf technology 
in a suburban garage a terrorist can create a weapon against which there is no effective 
defense.”[22]  
But before too much is made of do-it-yourself cruise missiles, it is important to note that it is by no 
means clear that Simpson’s efforts would have proven successful. Just because individual 
component parts are available from commercial vendors does not mean that they can readily and 
successfully be integrated to produce a reliable system. Such a notion smacks of technological 
determinism or a simple reductionist viewpoint, whereby technology diffuses easily and smoothly 
into complex systems. A more plausible explanation for achieving success with any military 
system—no matter how simple it may appear on the surface—hinges on the possession of 
certain tacit knowledge skills. In the case of a cruise missile, system engineering or integration 
skills are essential to integrate actuators and servo mechanisms that are crucial for moving the 
cruise missile’s control surfaces based on commands from a flight management computer. 
Simpson’s technical approach to the flight management task mistakenly implied that system 
integration can be accomplished easily and reliably. 
Two Scenarios  
Two particular scenarios of relevance to possible terrorist use of UAVs are worthy of examination. 
Besides differing in their complexity of development and execution, they diverge in their launch 
points of origin.  
The first entails launching a converted anti-ship cruise missile—transformed into one capable of 
flying over land—from a covertly equipped commercial vessel against a U.S. city or other target. 
Thus, the missile threat would emanate from outside of U.S. borders and face whatever aircraft 
NORAD could muster in time—assuming that such a low-flying missile were detected in the first 
place. The $10 billion a year that the United States spends on defenses against ballistic missiles 
does nothing to address this threat.[23] This scenario roughly equates to the one simulated in the 
2001 NORAD counterterrorism exercise and also stated in the 2002 NIE (albeit in the state-actor 
context).  
The second scenario focuses on converting a small aircraft into an armed UAV and launching it 
from a domestic point of origin against its intended target. Like al Qaeda’s exploitation of lax 
airport security on 9/11, this case would exploit extant shortcomings in U.S. capabilities to detect 
and intercept threats flying under the FAA’s radar system. Indeed, terrorists seem to be adjusting 
to 9/11’s positive effects on airport security. According to the director general of intelligence for 
Canada’s armed forces, terrorist groups have already purchased ultra-light aircraft and hang-
gliders to work around effective security precautions against hijacking large commercial 
airliners.[24] 
Scenario 1: Using Offshore Cruise Missiles 
The possibility of terrorist involvement in a cruise missile scenario is not purely hypothetical, nor 
is it based only on the NORAD counterterrorism exercise. According to two former National 
Security Council (NSC) staff members, al Qaeda is believed to possess 15 freighters.[25] This 
has raised concern that terrorists could manage to acquire, deploy, and successfully launch a 
cruise missile from just outside U.S. waters using a freighter as the launch platform. But such a 
proposition, fortunately, faces a number of obstacles.  
Rather than building a cruise missile from scratch, a more sensible approach would be to convert 
one of many widely available anti-ship cruise missiles, a proliferation course that Iran is currently 
thought to be following and one that Iraq attempted prior to the second Gulf War in March 2003. 
In Iran’s case, it is reported to be upgrading around 300 Chinese HY-2 Seersucker anti-ship 
cruise missiles by fitting them with turbojet engines and new guidance systems.[26] Using surplus 
Chinese missiles has certain important advantages, not least of which is their wide availability. 
From a weapons proliferation standpoint, Seersucker/Silkworm[27] anti-ship cruise missiles share 
the Scud ballistic missile’s ubiquity. They are available globally, even in such countries as 
Bangladesh, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Dubai, Egypt, Iran, Iraq (until 2003), North Korea, 
and Pakistan. Given their age, many surplus missiles are likely available at modest prices.  
For states, turning anti-ship cruise missiles into ones that can attack targets on land is nothing 
new. The U.S. Navy has converted the Harpoon anti-ship cruise missile—which is exported to 24 
nations—into the Stand-Off Land-Attack Missile (SLAM). Russia has done the same with its 
export family of Klub anti-ship missiles, one of which is being jointly produced by India and Russia 
under the name Brahmos. Yet, converting these modern anti-ship cruise missiles, which are 
densely packed with electronics and comparatively much smaller than the Seersucker/Silkworm 
family of missiles, offers little space for adding fuel to extend the range much beyond 100 km. 
Once the original autopilot and radar are removed from the Seersucker, however, there is 
significant space for additional fuel to propel the missile (assuming it uses a suitable turbojet 
engine) to around 1,000 km.[28]  
Thus, two challenges stand in the way of converting an anti-ship cruise missile into a land-attack 
system: finding and installing a suitable turbojet engine to replace the existing liquid rocket engine 
and replacing the anti-ship guidance and control system with a land-attack one. Achieving the first 
challenge permits the missile to be launched from a ship lying significantly outside U.S. territorial 
waters.[29] The second is necessitated by the different challenges of guiding a cruise missile over 
the flat sea compared with the more variegated surface of the earth. The former seaborne setting 
means that the anti-ship cruise missile can use a simple autopilot for navigation and a terminal 
radar guidance system to seek out a large metal object (a ship). Were such a guidance system 
used over land, it would encounter difficulty hitting its intended target, one that would normally 
furnish far less contrast than a ship at sea. And because cruise missiles intentionally fly low to 
avoid detection, they must negotiate over and around varied terrain (mountains and man-made 
objects, for example) before they reach their intended targets. These demands dictate the use of 
a more sophisticated guidance and navigation system.  
By no means should the challenges of converting a Seersucker into a land-attack cruise missile 
be seen as modest. Albeit limited in time, Iraq’s experience with the process illustrates the 
demands. Called the Jinin project, Iraq conceived of a program to extend the range of the 
Seersucker to 1,000 km in November 2001.[30] The program benefited, in part, from Iraq’s 
previously successful efforts to extend the Seersucker’s range from about 100 km to 150 km.[31] 
The Jinin project was approved in June 2002, but for fear of being discovered by UN inspectors 
upon their return to Iraq, the country abandoned the project in December 2002. Yet, Iraqi 
engineers indicated that the program would require three-to-five years of development time, 
integrating the work of several research, development, and production organizations.  
During the project’s short-lived initial phase, the development team used computer simulations to 
assure the structural integrity and stability of the missile once it was fitted with a new propulsion 
system. Originally using turbine engines from surplus Russian Mi-8 helicopters, Iraqi engineers 
encountered problems achieving enough thrust and turned to another more advanced helicopter 
turbine engine. The senior program manager for the project said that a flight test could be 
conducted in three years. No work was accomplished on the guidance and control system, as the 
Iraqis initially believed that the existing HY-2 guidance system could be used in the Jinin project. 
They eventually did recognize that a foreign global positioning system (GPS) system would have 
to be acquired and integrated into a flight management system, but decided to await completion 
of flight tests to prove that the Jinin’s new propulsion system worked satisfactorily without 
destabilizing the vehicle’s flight characteristics. This latter consideration was prompted by the 
realization that all of the internal rearrangements of the missile’s subsystem components 
(perhaps even including additional fuel bladders) would likely affect flight control and stability.  
Launching a modified Seersucker from a floating vessel presents yet another, if less difficult, 
problem. The missile would be nearly 8 meters long with a 2.4-meters-wide wingspan and a 
weight of nearly 3,000 kg. Although a standard 12-meter commercial shipping container would be 
more than adequate to house the missile, a small erector would have to be constructed to permit 
the missile to rise from the container for launching. Moreover, a solid rocket booster would be 
required to propel the missile from its erector to a height sufficient to commence flight via the 
turbojet engine.  
Taken together, these tasks are beyond the capabilities of small terrorist groups, unless they 
could arrange various shortcuts amounting to virtually wholesale dependence on a foreign state’s 
missile program. Moreover, there are numerous critical failure points along the path to completing 
this complex project, daunting even for state programs such as Iraq’s and Iran’s. It is far more 
likely that a terrorist group would choose significantly less sophisticated technical paths to 
develop a weapons delivery system. 
Scenario 2: Converting a Small Airplane into a UAV for Weapons Delivery  
Concern about the use of small UAVs as terrorist weapons began shortly after 9/11. By the 
following summer, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld reportedly sent the White House a 
classified memorandum warning about the spread of cruise missiles and UAVs and possible 
terrorist use of rudimentary technology to attack the homeland.[32] By early 2003, senior Bush 
administration officials told Wall Street Journal reporters that the President was keenly interested 
in intelligence reports that Iraq was developing small, easily transportable UAVs as weapons that 
could be shipped into the United States, or built here, and then be used to disseminate chemical 
or biological agents.[33]  
Iraq admitted to the UN that it had sought to convert manned aircraft, such as the MiG-21, into a 
chemical-biological weapons (CBW) platform in the early 1990s.And there is indirect evidence 
that the L-29 trainer aircraft, which also was converted into a UAV, may have been intended for 
CBW delivery. But the Iraqi Survey Group found in 2003, after Operation Iraqi Freedom, that 
Iraq’s small UAV (known as Al Musayara-20 and thought to be capable of disseminating 
biological agents) had not yet been equipped to do so. However, the Al Musayara-20 had the 
range (beyond 500 kilometers), payload (20 kg), guidance (GPS-aided), and autonomy needed to 
be an effective biological delivery means if the Iraqi leadership had decided to pursue such a 
course.[34]  
Although pre-war Iraq appears to have possessed the necessary skills and sufficient access to 
foreign assistance to develop such small UAVs for weapons delivery, it would be quite another 
matter for a terrorist group to accomplish the same task. Yet, with enough outside assistance and 
access to commercially available sub-components, it is at least conceivable—if not highly likely—
that a terrorist organization could develop a much cruder version of Iraq’s UAV exploits.  
Acquiring an ultra-light or kit-built recreational airplane represents perhaps the most worrisome 
terrorist course of pursuing an unmanned attack weapon. The distinction between an ultra-light 
and larger kit-built airplanes is primarily one of size—according to FAA regulations, a powered 
ultra-light cannot exceed 254 pounds of empty weight, cannot carry more than 5 gallons of 
gasoline, nor exceed more than 55 knots at full power in level flight.  
At first blush, one might assume that any terrorist group connected to al Qaeda would not require 
an unmanned vehicle. But attack effectiveness is in part dependent on the amount of payload that 
can be delivered. If a human is not piloting the aircraft, attack effectiveness could be greatly 
enhanced as the space otherwise devoted to a pilot and co-pilot can be given over to payload, 
conventional or otherwise.  
Even an ultra-light aircraft could carry 150 or more pounds of payload, more than enough to 
mount a suitable sprayer for a biological agent or a load of conventional explosives. As previously 
noted, radiological dispersal becomes possible and potentially effective with a UAV over large 
urban areas, but only if the source comes in powdered form. As for conventional payloads, while 
a small UAV doesn’t begin to compare with a jumbo jet’s 60 tons of fuel, it is important to note 
that even gasoline, when mixed with air, releases 15 times as much energy as an equal weight of 
TNT.[35] Thus, even very small planes carrying an extra large fuel tank in place of a pilot could 
do significant damage in an urban setting.  
Procuring a suitable aircraft is a vastly simpler task than turning it into an autonomous or even 
remotely controlled vehicle. By one accounting, the kit airplane market consists of nearly 100,000 
copies of over 400 different designs from a worldwide list of manufacturers.[36] An alternative 
course of action would be to use mini-UAVs, or model airplanes that can either be remotely 
controlled from the ground or programmed for autonomous flight.[37] According to press accounts, 
al Qaeda considered using remotely controlled airplanes packed with explosives to attack the G-8 
Summit in Genoa, Italy in 2001.[38] Working with smaller model aircraft surely reduces the 
chances of detection, but the limited amount of payload such models carry (a few pounds at most) 
is a limitation.  
Kit airplanes, on the other hand, furnish between 150 and 300 pounds of payload and can be 
constructed in a single-car garage. Flying them autonomously (by programming routes and way 
points into a flight management computer), rather than controlling them via line-of-sight radio 
commands from the ground, presents the greatest danger of detection due to the greater 
possibility of an accident. However, kit planes do not require an airport for launch and return. 
They can operate from flat fields in remote areas, thus reducing, if not eliminating, the chances of 
detection.  
Unlike the conversion of a first-generation, anti-ship cruise missile into a longer-range land-attack 
system, kit airplane conversion does not require a new propulsion system. The existing small 
reciprocating engine is sufficient to fly the craft to ranges of more than 500 miles. The stiffest 
challenge lies with integrating and properly installing and testing the various components needed 
to manage stable autonomous flight to a precise point on the ground.  
Achieving successful autonomous flight of a UAV is a daunting task for any terrorist group, even 
were they to have all the necessary technical skills. It would require at least two years of 
determined effort and some level of outside or foreign assistance. Although Iraq produced its own 
UAVs based on indigenous design plans, they still depended greatly on foreign assistance for 
access to British piston engines and commercial autopilots, servomechanisms, and guidance 
software.[39] Clearly, access to flight management systems not subject to export-control 
restrictions would save substantial development time and reduce the risk of catastrophic failure 
and detection.  
Devices like the ones acquired by the Iraqis, providing complete autonomous operation, a GPS 
aided auto-pilot, and automatic takeoff and landing capabilities, cost in the neighborhood of 
$5,000. Still, the complexity and risks involved in achieving successful autonomous flight make 
the terrorist acquisition of a UAV a low-probability but high-consequence threat. This assessment 
could change due to the rapid pace of change in all the technologies relevant to unmanned flight. 
Several new aerospace firms have emerged in the United States and other countries over the last 
five years to sell all the necessary components and services required for converting manned 
aircraft into UAVs. Controlling the sale of these technologies to legitimate parties and countries 
will grow increasingly problematic without national and multinational attention to the export control 
challenges these technologies present. 
International Responses to the Threat  
However low the probability is of a terrorist group building a UAV for weapons delivery on its own, 
the potential consequences of such a development demand consideration of appropriate 
responses. Military and non-military measures alike could ameliorate the threat’s emergence. 
Military improvements in defense against low-flying cruise missiles and UAVs—whether 
emanating from offshore or domestic points of origin—deserve immediate attention. The United 
States has deployed a rudimentary system to defend against a few intercontinental ballistic 
missiles, the return address of which will always be evident. Yet, expenditures to improve 
detection and interception of low-flying cruise missiles and UAVs pale by comparison. And 
because no amount of resources invested will produce a foolproof defense, it seems wise to also 
pursue improved nonproliferation policy. For example, national and multinational export controls 
could complicate easy access to UAV component technologies. The goal should be to create a 
mutually reinforcing set of responses to the threat of terrorist use of UAVs. 
Improving Defenses Against UAVs 
The technical, operational, and affordability challenges of defending against both offshore and 
domestic UAV threats are daunting. Consider, on the one hand, the requirements of defending 
against a low-flying cruise missile launched from a merchant ship. The first challenge is detecting 
a worrisome vessel from the many that come close to U.S. shores. At any one time in the Atlantic 
and Pacific oceans, there are roughly 100,000 vessels with enough space to house and launch a 
cruise missile.  
Since 9/11, the U.S. Coast Guard has begun to pay much closer attention to foreign ships 
wishing to enter U.S. ports; such ships are now routinely inspected before reaching U.S. 
shores.[40] But prior to any inspection, a terrorist or rogue vessel could launch a subsonic missile 
flying at Mach 0.7 from a range of 500 km and reasonably expect it to escape detection.[41] If 
launched from 100 km offshore, the missile would need only about 7 minutes to reach its target, 
detection and capture would be more likely. Even if U.S. air defenses were not alert to the threat, 
the low-flying missile would fly under current ground-based warning radars that were designed to 
deal with high-flying Soviet-era aircraft. Even were U.S. aircraft scrambled in enough time to react, 
current rules of engagement require a visual identification of the target to eliminate the possibility 
of shooting down a commercial aircraft. Thus, major improvements are needed across the so-
called “kill chain”—cueing, surveillance, identification, engagement and kill assessment.  
NORAD and the Army are currently studying the idea of an unmanned airship operating at an 
altitude of 65,000 feet and carrying sensors to monitor and detect offshore low-flying cruise 
missiles. Several airships would be needed together with fast-moving interceptors (perhaps a mix 
of ground-based and airborne ones) to cope with offshore threats. Perhaps 100 aerostats at an 
altitude of 15,000 feet could act as a complementary or alternative system of surveillance and fire 
control for an interceptor fleet.  
Still, other problems remain. Some method of information relay is needed to warn to the Coast 
Guard of potentially hostile ships embarking from ports of concern. Missile threat sensor data 
must be capable of distinguishing between friendly traffic and enemy threats prior to threat 
engagement. Progress in national cruise missile defense will not be made without corresponding 
improvements in respective service programs, foremost among those being the implementation of 
the Single Integrated Air Picture (SIAP) program. Started in 1969—and still far from 
implementation—SIAP requires the merging of disparate service data links and target tracking 
radars to achieve a truly multiple-aspect view of enemy threats. Having one fully interoperable 
view of the air picture would accelerate decision-making in identifying friend from foe, a critical 
requirement given the dense commercial air traffic off the U.S. East and West coasts.  
The question of affordability looms large. Even a limited defense against offshore cruise missiles 
would cost $30-40 billion. Yet, none of these costs or technical challenges pertains to improved 
defenses against domestic threats. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, 
NORAD had no internal air picture. Nor were its radar assets linked with those of the FAA, which 
controls internal US-air traffic. Progress towards making such linkages has occurred but major 
gaps remain, especially when dealing with the detection of low- and slow-flying air targets. One 
area showing particular promise, not least because of its potential affordability, is the exploitation 
of the nation’s existing high definition television infrastructure to detect, track, and classify such 
low-flying threats. Still, for the foreseeable future, the nation will remain ill-prepared to cope with 
such threats. 
Improving Missile Nonproliferation Policy 
The 34-nation Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is the only extant multilateral, supply-
side arrangement covering the transfer of missiles, related equipment, material, and technology 
relevant to WMD delivery. The MTCR found reason to worry about terrorist access to UAVs 
shortly after 9/11. At its 2002 annual plenary meeting in Warsaw, MTCR member states took the 
first step toward addressing possible terrorist use of UAVs and cruise missiles. Members 
committed to examine ways of limiting the risk of controlled items and their technologies falling 
into the hands of terrorist groups and individuals. Since announcing this commitment, the 
membership has revised its control list of systems and technologies, placing controls on UAVs 
designed or modified to dispense an aerosol of a volume greater than 20 liters. Yet, nothing thus 
far has been accomplished to address terrorist or state access to flight management systems 
capable of readily transforming manned aircraft into UAVs.  
In January 2003, because of the growing concern about terrorist use of kit airplanes and other 
civil aircraft to create makeshift, lethal UAVs, the United States introduced an “anti-terrorism” 
proposal within the 34-nation Wassenaar Arrangement.[42] The proposal was designed to place 
export control reviews on all equipment, systems, and specially designed components that would 
enable airplanes to be converted to UAVs. But, because of its lack of specificity, the U.S. 
proposal received little support within the Wassenaar community.  
At a March 2004 House Government Reform Committee hearing on ways of improving controls 
on cruise missiles and UAVs, the January 2003 “anti-terrorism” proposal to the Wassenaar 
Arrangement was raised during the question and answer period. In response to a query, Lisa 
Bronson, Director of the Defense Technology Security Administration and an undersecretary of 
defense, stated that the United States would reintroduce its proposal to control flight management 
within the Wassenaar Arrangement.[43] In light of the MTCR’s more aggressive interest in 
assuring that its controlled technologies do not fall into terrorist hands, the Wassenaar regime 
should investigate closely how it might improve controls on UAV guidance and navigation 
technologies. By comparison with Wassenaar, the MTCR possesses strong denial rules and no-
undercut provisions (meaning if one member states denies a transfer, all must follow), making it 
the most effective multilateral mechanism to address the issue. The State Department’s Director 
of the Office of Chemical, Biological, and Missile Nonproliferation, Vann H. Van Diepen, indicated 
at the 2004 House hearing that his office planned to strengthen regulations dealing with missile 
guidance and propulsion.[44] 
Conclusion 
Although the United States alone cannot deal with the challenge of reducing terrorist access to 
technologies relevant to employing UAVs as weapons, it can exert its leadership role among key 
MTCR partners to convince the overall membership to reach consensus on this matter. Such a 
strengthening of export control regulations would make the prospect of transforming small 
manned aircraft into unmanned terror weapons substantially more difficult than it is today.  
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